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Rev. Robert P. Maloney, C.M. 
Father Maloney, who received 
his S. T.D. from the Catholic Uni-
versity of America, was rector of 
Mary Immaculate Seminary from 
1970-79, and presently is rector 
of the Vincentian Residence. 
New discoveries give rise to new questions. As we have come to 
understand man's physical makeup better, not only have we grown in 
knowing what man is, but we have also asked more and more what he 
might become. 
Questions in regard to genetic engineering are very numerous. Many 
have not yet been asked. This article will pose a few of those which 
are already being raised. It will also propose very tentative responses 
or in some cases merely further questions. Let me emphasize that the 
field of genetic engineering is largely uncharted territory. Moral anal-
ysis in this area must therefore be quite tentative. 
At the same time, it is important to assert from the beginning that 
we need not do everything that it is possible to do . We need not (in 
the moral sense) build nuclear weapons, nor need we use them. I trust 
that it is self-evident that there are many things that it is possible to 
do which we ought not do. In this context, it is imperative that 
ethicians reflect beforehand in order to make at least provisional 
moral judgments about "remaking man." Ought we remake him? Will 
remaking him really destroy him? The consequences of genetic 
engineering are huge , sometimes unknown . Since man himself, not just 
his sexuality or his offspring, is at stake, we must proceed cautiously. 
266 Linacre Quarterly 
This is obvious in all life and death questions, but unfortunately con-
temporary experience proves that what is obvious is not always the 
operative principle in moral matters. 
This article will touch on seven areas connected with genetic engin-
eering. It makes no pretense at being exhaustive. Many other topics 
could be touched on. Even in the areas that the article does treat, 
much more could be said. It is for this reason that I have entitled the 
article "Some Notes." 
1. Artificial Insemination 
This question has little early history. Artificial insemination of 
human beings has been going on only since 1884. Interestingly, how-
ever, the history of the moral question in the Catholic Church has 
given rise to some fine statements on the unitive end of marriage. I 
will allude to these below. 
In the late 19th century, Palmieri1 and Berardi 2 approved artificial 
insemination. In doing so, they raised a question about whether or not 
the seed for the procedure could be obtained through masturbation. 
They offered the opinion that, properly speaking, such an act would 
not be masturbation since it was geared to procreation. 
The first official Church teaching statement about artificial insemin-
ation came from the Holy Office in March, 1897. The question had 
been posed as to whether or not artificial insemination might be used. 
The answer was in the negative. But moralists disagreed in their inter-
pretation of the response. Naturally, masturbation would be the usual 
means of procuring seed. Some felt that this was the reason why arti-
ficial insemination was condemned. But if seed could be collected in 
some licit way (masturbation being judged intrinsically evil), then 
would artificial insemination be permitted, at least when the woman 's 
husband was the donor (AIH) ? A number of reputable Catholic moral-
ists (Noldin, Wouters, Vermeersch, G. Kelly) 3 judged that AIH would 
be licit if seed could be procured by some licit means . Pius XII 
brought at least a temporary halt to this debate. He condemned all 
artificial insemination. 
In 1949, in an address to Catholic doctors, Pius declared that 
artificial insemination is to be "absolutely rejected." 4 He stated that 
the marriage contract has as its object not a child but natural acts 
destined for the generation of new life . This statement seemed clearly 
to exclude AIH as well as AID (contribution of seed by a donor). If 
any doubt was left, Pius further clarified the matter in November, 
1951 5 and again in 1956 in his Address to the Second World Congress 
on Fertility and Sterility. 6 
Pius' reasoning is significant. He points out that sexual relations are 
an expression of love, and in expressing love they are fruitful. 
Artificial insemination will produce a child, but not in the context of 
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sexual acts apt for the expression of love. In more biblical terms, in 
"becoming one flesh," married couples "increase and multiply." The 
two-fold significance of their sexual acts should not be "put asunder." 
It is significant to note that the reasoning here is quite similar to the 
reasoning used in the prohibition of birth control in Humanae Vitae; 
namely, the unitive and procreative significance of the marital act 
should not be separated. 
Today many theologians question the prohibition of AIR. Their 
reasoning for dissenting from the teaching of Pius XII is much the 
same as the reasoning in dissenting from Humanae Vitae. Such dissent 
tries to show how the unitive finality of sexuality is promoted by 
artificial insemination, just as the procreative finality is promoted. 
For our purposes here, however, it is not necessary to enter into 
this discussion, since AIR is not in a substantial way used precisely for 
genetic engineering. The genetic engineering question revolves more 
around AID . But what is presented above about AIR will be helpful in 
understanding the historical background for several questions which 
we shall treat below. 
Different from AIR, AID bears with it the further moral complica-
tion of the presence of a third party's seed. There can be cases where 
the concerns giving rise to AID are similar to those giving rise to AIR 
(e.g. , where a husband is desirous, but incapable of, "giving his wife a 
child"). More commonly, however, AID in contemporary literature is 
thought of as a means of genetic engineering. If you select the right 
kind of donor, you might produce a preprogrammed man: smart, 
strong, etc . Select specimens of semen could be chosen, labeled, 
frozen, until the time of use arrives. 
From a moral point of view, some tentative remarks in regard to 
AID as a means of genetic engineering are in order (I prescind here 
from the use of AID simply as a means of procreation, though some of 
the things said below are applicable): 
a) AID tends to biologize (depersonalize) sex . One of the ways in 
which human freedom is most radically realized is through intimacy. 
Sexual relations are among the most profound signs of intimacy. 
Through them man expresses his love for another in a clear, self-
entrusting way. This is the moral context of human child-bearing. The 
child is a creation in love by two responsible parents. In the Christian 
understanding of things, this creation is meant to take place in an 
atmosphere of mutual love; conversely, marital love is geared to 
creativity. This central affirmation in the teaching of Pius XII still 
stands as a basic reason for opposing AID when it is used as a means of 
genetic engineering. 
b) AID brings with it the intrusion of a third party into the exclu-
sive spiritual-emotional-physical union we call marriage. The donor's 
seed is the sign of the presence of a third party . Motherhood does 
come about, but it comes into existence in a given marriage without 
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real fatherhood. One must certainly ask what psychological and 
emotional implications this may have for the husband in the marriage. 
Beyond this, the role of the donor is also quite depersonalized. The 
personal thrust of his own sexuality is obliterated (especially if his 
donations are anonymous). Intimacy is non-existent. His sexuality is 
all the more depersonalized if his seed is sold. (One might imagine a 
young man working his way through college by means of the money 
earned from selling his seed.) 
c) AID as a means of genetic engineering is destructive of family. 
Today, family life is in crisis. There are more than 10 million broken 
marriages and, consequently, broken families. If anything, civil society 
and the churches should be seeking ways of strengthening family ties. 
AID fosters "fatherless" children, or anonymous families. If healthy 
family life is essential to healthy society, are not the advantages of 
AID purchased at a price which is destructive of man's broader goals? 
d) AID constitutes a threat to man as such. One wonders, in 
principle, whether AID does not aim either at what is impossible or at 
what would be ultimately destructive of man as man. Man is both free 
and the object of external determination. He has a destiny which is 
free, but also at least partially accepted and not chosen. In principle, 
AID aims at eliminating some or all of the "accepted." But eliminating 
all determination is impossible. Since only partial elimination of deter-
mination is possible, then this would seem inevitably, in the sinful 
order of things, to lead to "races" (the "bred" and "non-bred"). 
Would not the result be increased prejudice, struggle for control, class 
wars, etc.? 
e) AID bears the threat of massive external (state) control within 
the sphere of intimacy. Who decides what is to be done and what it is 
good to do? Certainly if AID is to be effective in producing a pure 
strain, more than individual decisions are needed. Ultimately, the state 
would have to issue detailed directives on sexual "relations" (in what-
ever form they might take). 
f) AID bears with it many other questionable consequences. One 
must certainly seek to foresee all of the consequences of acts. As I 
stated at the outset, not everything that can be done ought to be 
done. In this regard one might ask many questions about AID . Is there 
an age factor which affects sperm and brings about defective off-
spring? If there is intermarriage among children with the same 
"fathers" (as seems inevitable if donors are anonymous), will this 
result in defective offspring? To avoid this, will it not be necessary to 
license donors, to identify them, etc.? Since there are many recessive 
genes, might not a multiplication of hidden genetic defects occur? 
Would the multiplication of anonymous donors bring about disintegra-
tion of family life? Basically, are the goals (values) of AID worth the 
risks (consequences)? More basically, what are the value-goals? Could 
they be achieved in other ways? 
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2. In Vitro Fertilization 
With the birth of Louise Brown in Bristol, this has become one of 
the popular questions of the day. Actually, cases like the Brown case 
are not the object of this article (which focuses specifically on genetic 
engineering). The moral considerations surrounding the Brown case 
(and other cases in which a zygote fertilized in vitro is implanted in a 
womb) are similar to those involved in AIH or possibly AID. Several of 
the considerations presented below, particularly those revolving 
around the unsuccessful outcome of experiments prior to successful 
fertilization and implantation, are also most relevant. 
Actually, if scientific techniques were improved, in vitro fertiliza-
tion, combined with AID and super-ovulation, could bring about 
massive productivity of select types. These could be implanted in the 
wombs of willing carriers. 
Mutatis mutandis, the same moral concerns mentioned in the first 
section, are applicable to the problem of in vitro fertilization for the 
purposes of genetic engineering. One must add to this the principle of 
Catholic moral theology that the zygote should be treated as human 
life from the time of fertilization (I prescind here from the question of 
whether blastocyst is the more critical moment for identifying fetal 
life as human). Today there is no possibility of bringing human life to 
term outside the womb. Therefore, most experimentation with in 
vitro human fertilization (for the purposes of genetic engineering) is 
for the future, not for the sake of the life actually involved. It could 
be described, consequently, as the non-free use of a person for future 
generations. This would be morally reprehensible. 
Several common-sense rules suggest themselves here: a) we must 
never submit another human person to experimental procedures to 
which he cannot consent (or where his consent could not reasonably 
be presumed) when these procedures have no relationship to his own 
treatment; b) no such experiment should be conducted where a priori 
there is reason to believe that death or disabling injury will occur. 
3. Cloning 
It is now common knowledge (and the occasion for much science 
fiction) that the nucleus of an unfertilized ovum can be removed or 
destroyed and then replaced by the nucleus of a cell taken from the 
body of some man or woman. This produces a twin of the person 
supplying the nucleus. Contrary to some recent writing, there is no 
scientific evidence that a human person has ever been cloned success-
fully . 
It should be immediately evident that cloning involves problems 
similar to those mentioned in part one above, but a fortiori. Cloning 
would not just biologize sex, it could eliminate it. Cloning tries to 
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guarantee carbon copies. But many questions arise: How much are the 
carbon copies like the original? How much freedom do they have? If 
freedom is diminished, are there not grotesque possibilities of 
domination? 
One may also ask if cloning might not produce an evolutionary 
dead end. Evolutionary theory revolves around "natural selection." 
Might man's variability and adaptability be lost through cloning? 
Might the race lose the very thing which enables it to survive? 
If one is interested in flights of the imagination, cloning could also 
eliminate men. All that is necessary to clone is an ovum, a nucleus and 
a womb, all female products. If backlash were to take place against 
today's chauvinist society, women could really take over! Of course, 
something similar could happen in the opposite direction. If with 
scientific advances wombs could be replaced by incubators, then only 
a very small number of women would really be necessary. Drugs could 
keep them tame (!) and superovulating. Men could then be cloned in 
great numbers. Every 20 years or so a fresh small group of super-
ovulating women could be cloned. The women could be kept in differ-
ent camps throughout the world so that no natural disaster could wipe 
them out. But enough of all that. 
4. Genetic Disease and Surgery 
This is a very different question. There are about 100 such identi-
fied diseases. If we can treat them, then it is imperative to do so, all 
other things being equal. The principles here are the same as for all 
corrective surgery. 
Naturally, today much is unknown about the nature of genetic 
diseases and the ways of correcting them. Techniques are primitive. 
There is a high risk of mistakes. In all consideration of surgery, even 
apart from the question of genetic surgery, there must be a reasonable 
expectation of more good than harm. This is quite precarious today 
when talking about genetic disease and surgery. 
In principle, therefore, genetic surgery is permissible, even desirable, 
but in practice it may be questionable. Similar principles would apply 
to genetic surgery that is not corrective, but is aimed at improving the 
race. Naturally, in the latter regard, many other moral questions 
would have to be asked about what values should be sought, who 
decides on them, what the risks are, etc. 
5. Who Decides on the Ideal? 
This question could better be phrased: what is the ideal and who 
decides on it? Is the ideal longer life? Intelligence? Strength? Self-
improvement? Control? 
One can raise questions about all of these goals. For example, do we 
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really want longer life? Would that make human life better or worse, 
given the present state of world population growth? One may ask 
whether achieving increased intelligence through AID or cloning 
would really benefit man. Would it produce real wisdom? Would there 
be corresponding development in the affective life of those cloned for 
this end? Could not a computer do much of the work we might expect 
of the superintelligent? 
Control over decisions about the ideal is equivalent to control over 
the destiny of mankind. Should that be left to the state? C.S. Lewis 
once observed that man's power over nature is really the power of 
some men over other men, with nature as their instrument. 
In cloning and much genetic engineering, increased control over the 
product is purchased by increasing depersonalization of the process. Is 
this really worth it? 
6. What To Do with Mistakes? 
Many mistakes would be likely to result from genetic engineering. 
That is the usual by-product of experimental processes. The results 
could be monsters and subhuman phenomena of various sorts. Some 
warnings are in order here. Great precaution is needed in dealing with 
human life. Procedures during the space program and moon landings 
illustrated this. Long years of preparation went into these programs 
before human beings became involved. One does not risk human life in 
the precarious states of experimentation, yet experiments in genetic 
engineering are already doing this. If one holds the Catholic position 
that from the time of fertilization the zygote deserves respect as 
human life, then such experiments are all the more irresponsible. 
All experiments should have reasonable hope of success. Mistakes 
must be avoided as far as possible. Once there are mistakes, we must 
decide on their humanity (a very difficult question). If they are 
human, then they deserve care. 
A forceful argument can be made that the inevitable mistakes alone 
are a sufficient argument for abstaining from cloning. 
7. Animal-Human Combinations 
One might also speak here about human-machine combinations, or 
cyborgs. 
In principle, to fabricate a man with diminished freedom seems rep-
rehensible. It would also be an historical step backwards (we might 
think of slavery, serfs, "drones" of different types). This would seem 
to apply to both "animal-human " combinations (which we might find 
it handy to have around as serfs or, to recall Joseph Fletcher's 8 awful 
suggestion, to test radiation-contaminated areas to see if they are safe 
for the rest of us) and to human-machine combinations (which might 
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be very intelligent or very strong, but non-affective and perhaps even 
minimally bodily). 
One may certainly also ask if it is not purely and simply wrong to 
create non-affective human beings. 
As Karl Rahner 9 points out, there is an instinctive moral sense 
which often cannot be adequately articulated by human reasoning. Of 
course, we should try to articulate such moral instincts. Nonetheless, 
just as there are faith-instincts, which, at least for a period of time, 
remain obscure, so also there are moral-instincts which in any given 
era are not fully explicable. The instincts in much contemporary 
ethical literature 10 on genetic engineering are very cautious and fre-
quently negative . Though we cannot (yet) explain these fully (as is 
obvious from the incompleteness of the remarks above), it may still be 
wise to follow them! 
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